Opinion

Xi’s greatest power is what he chooses not to do

As Trump and Putin struggle to end their wars, China is gaining influence through restraint.

By Wenran Jiang

Founding director of the China Institute and Mactaggart Research Chair Emeritus at the University of Alberta.

20 Nov 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump attend a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Shenzhen, China, on November 19, 2026 [Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Sputnik/ via Reuters]

Before Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met for their first trilateral summit in Shenzhen, commentators were already asking whether this would be “Yalta 2.0”: three great powers dividing the world and deciding the fate of smaller nations. When a reporter put the question to Putin, the Russian president paused and nodded. Xi, meanwhile, urged the three countries to abandon “Cold War thinking”. Recalling how they had “fought side by side” during World War II, he declared: “when major countries live in harmony, the world enjoys peace; when major countries clash, the world falls into turmoil.”

The summit produced the China-Russia-US Declaration toward Peace, rather than the carve-up some had predicted. But the meeting also revealed a striking difference between the three leaders. Two were mired in wars they could not bring to a satisfactory end, while the third was fighting neither. Beijing had the weight to change the others’ odds and had chosen not to use it.

Trump came to Shenzhen fresh from a midterm rout that handed both chambers of Congress to the Democrats. He is also waging a war against Iran he cannot win outright. Since it erupted in February, the conflict has rattled oil and energy supplies, drawn in the Houthis in Yemen and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. He arrived, by one account, no longer chasing votes but achievements, a president running out of options. Putin came trailing a war in Ukraine now in its fifth year, isolated by the West and with an economy losing momentum.

Ukraine was on the agenda: the three discussed the war at the American president’s initiative. Yet the American envoys tasked with ending it, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, travelled to Berlin to brief Ukraine and European leaders, who were determined not to be excluded from decisions about the war. Zelenskyy, awaiting his debrief there, put it plainly: issues concerning Ukraine must be decided with Ukraine, and those concerning Europe, with Europe. Any agreement reached in Shenzhen would still have to contend with the demands of those directly involved in the conflict.

Beijing’s position on Ukraine offers another perspective on the war. Chinese officials have posed the counterfactual plainly: had China chosen to arm Russia, the front would not look as it does today. Strategists describe its approach as “constructive neutrality”, arguing that siding openly would have widened the war, while China’s own red lines lowered the nuclear temperature.

Meanwhile, the fighting continued. As the leaders met, Russian drones hit Kharkiv, and Ukraine struck oil facilities in Tatarstan and hit the Kerch Bridge for the third time in a week. The war was being settled not at the diplomatic table but on the ground, which is exactly why a room in Shenzhen could not carve it up.

China’s reluctance to accept commitments on other powers’ terms was also apparent in the nuclear discussions. Washington has long sought a trilateral nuclear arms control framework involving Russia and China, but Beijing has refused to join on equal terms. Its arsenal, at an estimated 620 warheads, is a fraction of the American and Russian stockpiles of some 5,000 each, a disparity Beijing cites in declining equal terms.

The declaration the three leaders issued covered UN reform, more refined oil supply, opposition to what they described as abuses of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court, and a pledge that a nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought”. Critics called it the lowest common denominator. They were right about the limited substance, but Beijing had managed to convene the other two powers on its own terms, without agreeing to the division of the world that some had anticipated.

China today occupies the position the United States held before 1914 and again before 1939: the power whose restraint, more than anyone’s force, is setting the terms. The heft is real: on purchasing-power terms the largest economy on Earth, a manufacturing base roughly equal to the G7 combined, a military leading in a growing list of categories. China could alter the trajectory of the wars now being fought. Each, in its own way, runs through Beijing: the war in Ukraine, the confrontation with Iran and the turbulence spilling across the Middle East.

Beijing’s treatment of Trump at the summit was revealing. Diminished at home and abroad, he was given centre stage: a welcome on the tarmac, a front-row seat at the group photograph and a state banquet. Commentators called it a host humbling a supplicant, but it was the weakened guest who was being given a platform. Offering Trump dignity was not a sign of submission. Beijing could afford to do so while conserving its leverage.

China, however, is not without vulnerabilities. It faces a tightening security arc along its periphery, a property market still working through weakness, a youth jobs problem and a military still reckoning with corruption in its own ranks. Beijing’s “constructive” posture is in part a judgement that exercising its influence too freely would expose its limits.

The smaller economies of the region, the ones the Yalta frame assumes are being carved up, are, if anything, the beneficiaries. Their stability is a by-product of a restraint they had no hand in negotiating. That is a strange thing to call domination.

Yalta was powers carving up a world they then fought over. Shenzhen was different: leaders unable to finish their wars gathered before one who could tip the balance but had chosen not to. Xi expressed confidence that the seeds planted at the meeting would eventually bear fruit, a bet, not a result.

The “Yalta 2.0” label endures because it is a flattering story, but the world on display in Shenzhen is not governed; it is balanced. China’s greatest power may lie in the wars it has chosen not to enter and its refusal to end them on terms set by others.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.